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Abstract
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) show that strategic delegation reduces
firm profits in the one-shot Cournot game. Allowing for infinitely repeated interaction,
strategic delegation can increase firm profits as it improves cartel stability.
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JEL codes: D43, L13, L20, L41
1 Introduction
The strategic delegation literature shows how firms’ profitability is reduced by delegating
control to a manager being remunerated with a fraction of profit and sales (Fershtman and
Judd, 1987; Sklivas, 1987—hereafter: FJS).1 This paper extends FJS’s seminal model to an
infinitely repeated setting, thus allowing firm owners as well as managers to collude. Strategic
delegation can then increase firms’ profitability through improving cartel stability.2
Figure 1 illustrates this result graphically. Denoting ⇡⇤ as the standard Cournot profit
and ⇡⇤d as the Cournot profit in the delegation equilibrium, Figure 1a depicts FJS’s finding
that delegation reduces profits in the one-shot Cournot game, independent of discount factor
⇤This paper is based on Chapter 4 of my PhD thesis Vertical Relations in Cartel Theory, written at the
Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE), University of Amsterdam. I am grateful for their support.
I also thank Jeanine Miklos-Thal, Patrick Rey, Maarten Pieter Schinkel, Bert Schoonbeek, Randolph Sloof,
Jan Tuinstra, and Jeroen van de Ven for constructive discussions and comments. This research is supported
by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft via the Collaborative Research Center 649 “Economic Risk”.
†Institute for Microeconomic Theory, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Spandauer Strasse 1, D-10178
Berlin, Germany. Email: martijn.alexander.han@hu-berlin.de.
1This result holds for FJS’s most elaborate case of Cournot competition.
2Relatedly, Lambertini and Trombetta (2002) extend Vickers’ (1985) model—which can be rewritten in
terms of FJS’s model—and derive different results by implicitly assuming that firm owners do not react
rationally on a managerial defection. Han (2011) comments on their analysis by considering rational players.
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 . However, allowing for infinitely repeated interaction, Figure 1b illustrates that delegation
increases the set of discount factors for which firms can collude on the monopoly profit ⇡m
from [ ⇤, 1] to [ ⇤d, 1], thus increasing profits over the range [ ⇤d,  ⇤).
 
⇡
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Figure 1A. Profits in the one-shot
Cournot delegation game (FJS).
Figure 1B. Profits in the infinitely
repeated Cournot delegation game.
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The intuition is two-fold. First, a manager defecting from collusion can be fiercely pun-
ished by the owners as they can stop delegating control (and potentially fire the manager);
this reduces the managers’ incentive to defect. Second, the possibility of delegating control
to managers allows collusion between owners on the product market to be supported by re-
verting to FJS’s unprofitable delegation equilibrium; an owner defecting from collusion faces
punishment profit ⇡⇤d < ⇡⇤, which reduces the owners’ incentive to defect.
The formal part of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model
and derives useful benchmarks. Section 3 characterizes the collusive delegation equilibrium
(3.1), studies product market collusion by owners without delegation in equilibrium (3.2),
and allows managers to be fired (3.3). Section 4 concludes.
2 The Infinitely Repeated Strategic Delegation Model
Consider FJS’s delegation game as the stage game. Two homogenous firms i 2 {1, 2} produce
at unit cost c   0 and compete in quantities, facing linear demand
p = a  bQ, b > 0, a > c, (1)
where p is market price, Q = q1 + q2 is total output, and qi is output of firm i. Each firm i is
owned by profit-maximizing owner i (female) who may delegate control to manager i (male)
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by remunerating him with a fraction ↵i of profit ⇡i, plus a fraction 1 ↵i of sales Si, that is,
Mi = ↵i⇡i + (1  ↵i)Si,
which can be rewritten as Mi = (p  ↵ic) qi by using (1). The managerial outside option is
normalized to zero.3 The timing of the stage game is:
1. Both owners simultaneously decide whether to delegate or to keep control.
2. If owner i delegates, she sets incentives ↵i simultaneously with her rival.
3. The players in control of the firms simultaneously set quantities on the market.
Repeated Interaction. The stage game is played in each period t 2 {1, ...,1}, allowing
for collusion on three dimensions: the delegation decision, incentives ↵i, and quantities qi.
Owners and managers maximize their discounted stream of payoffs using discount factor
 own and  man, respectively. To keep the analysis clean and to stay in line with the literature,
collusion is on the monopoly quantity and punishment on the product market is characterized
by reversion to the static Nash equilibrium forever. Everything is common knowledge and
fully observable to all players. I focus on symmetric equilibria and denote i’s rival by j.
Superscripts {⇤,m,D} denote the Nash, collusive (monopoly), and deviating variables,
respectively. Subscript d indicates that control of firm i is delegated to manager i. Collusion
by player x 2 {owner i,manager i} is stable if and only if discount factor  x satisfies
 x   [defection payoff of player x]  [collusive payoff of player x]
[defection payoff of player x]  [punishment payoff of player x] , 8i 2 {1, 2} . (2)
Benchmarks. Consider the following benchmarks, which are formally derived in Appendix
A. In FJS’s one-shot Cournot delegation game, owners are captured in a prisoner’s dilemma
and cannot avoid delegation, resulting in equilibrium incentives, quantities, and payoffs
↵⇤di =
6
5
  a
5c
, q⇤di =
2 (a  c)
5b
,M⇤di =
4 (a  c)2
25b
, ⇡⇤di =
2 (a  c)2
25b
, (3)
3In their original framework, FJS consider rewards Ai + BiMi. Since the managerial outside option is
normalized to zero, owners optimally set Ai = 0 and Bi arbitrarily small, say Bi = ✏i > 0. With delegation,
owner i then earns ⇡i   ✏iMi and manager i earns ✏iMi. In the limit when ✏i # 0, (i) term ✏iMi has an
infinitesimally small impact on owner i’s payoff and, therefore, she essentially behaves so as to maximize
profit ⇡i, whereas (ii) manager i’s payoff only consists of ✏iMi and, therefore, she maximizes Mi.
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which entails a lower profit than if owners would have been able to escape delegation and
play the standard Cournot game,
q⇤i =
a  c
3b
, ⇡⇤i =
(a  c)2
9b
. (4)
In the infinitely repeated standard Cournot game, collusion is stable if and only if
 own   ⇡
D
i   ⇡mi
⇡Di   ⇡⇤i
=
9
17
, with
qmi =
a  c
4b
, ⇡mi =
(a  c)2
8b
. (5)
3 Delegation and Collusion
This section derives the collusive delegation equilibrium when managers cannot be fired (3.1),
how the very possibility of delegation improves collusion on the product market between
owners (3.2), and the collusive delegation equilibrium when managers can be fired (3.3).
3.1 The Collusive Delegation Equilibrium
The collusive delegation equilibrium yielding monopoly profits entails owners delegating con-
trol and colluding by giving no incentives for sales, thereby “selling the store” to managers
who collude on the product market. Appendix B formally derives that
↵mdi = 1, q
m
di =
a  c
4b
,Mmdi =
(a  c)2
8b
, ⇡mdi =
(a  c)2
8b
, (6)
which is stable if and only if owners as well as managers have no incentive to defect.
Owner’s defection. Owners can defect in two ways: they can (i) defect in stage 2 by
setting incentives different from ↵mdi, or (ii) defect in stage 1 by not delegating at all.
If owner i defects by setting different incentives, then managers optimally react with Nash
competition in stage 3 so as to punish the deviant owner. Conditional on owner i defecting
to incentives ↵i, Nash quantities in stage 3 are qi (↵i) = a+(1 2↵i)c3 and qj (↵i) =
a+(↵i 2)c
3 ,
yielding
⇡i (↵i) =
✓
a  b
✓
a+ (1  2↵i) c
3
+
a+ (↵i   2) c
3
◆
  c
◆
a+ (1  2↵i) c
3
,
4
which is maximized at ↵i = 54  a4c with ⇡i = (a c)
2
8b . As defection profit equals collusive profit,
while triggering future punishment, owners would never make such a defection.
If instead owner i defects by not delegating at all, this triggers Nash competition with
her rival’s manager j in stage 3. Owner i and manager j respectively maximize ⇡i (qi, qj) =
(a  b (qi + qj)  c) qi and Mj (qi, qj) = (a  b (qi + qj)  c) qj, resulting in profit ⇡i = (a c)
2
9b ,
which is lower than the collusive profit. Therefore, owners do not defect from the delegation
decision. Lemma 1 summarizes.
Lemma 1 Independent of the discount factor  own, owners do not defect from collusion.
Managerial defection. If manager i defects from the collusive quantity qmdi = a c4b , she
does so by maximizing
Mi (qi) =
✓
a  b
✓
qi   a  c
4b
◆
  c
◆
qi,
yielding deviant quantity qi = 3(a c)8b with payoff Mi =
9(a c)2
64b . To optimally prevent such
a managerial defection, owners will want to avoid delegating control to managers in future
periods, thereby fiercely punishing the manager with a zero payoff.4 Using condition (2), i.e.,
 man  
⇣
9(a c)2
64b   ⇡mdi
⌘
/
⇣
9(a c)2
64b   0
⌘
, Lemma 2 states the resulting stability condition.
Lemma 2 Managers do not defect from collusion if and only if  man   19 .
Owner’s commitment to avoid delegation. Whether owners are indeed able to punish
managers by avoiding delegation depends on the owners’ patience  own. Appendix D shows
that the owners’ commitment to not delegate suffers from FJS’s prisoners dilemma when
owners compete on quantities while keeping control, but it is no concern when owners collude
on quantities while keeping control.
When owners punish a deviant manager by keeping control and colluding on quantities
themselves, equilibrium profit during punishment is ⇡mi =
(a c)2
8b , while defection results in
profit ⇡Di =
9(a c)2
64b , but triggers FJS’s one-shot delegation equilibrium with profit ⇡
⇤
di =
2(a c)2
25b . Using condition (2), i.e.,  own  
 
⇡Di   ⇡mi
 
/
 
⇡Di   ⇡⇤di
 
, we arrive at Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 After a manager defected, owners can commit to avoid delegation iff.  o   2597 .
As one can argue that discount factors are determined on financial markets, rational owners
and managers with access to such markets can be assumed to be equally patient, i.e.,  own =
 man =  . Combining Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, gives the following proposition.
4Appendix C checks that such punishment is indeed optimal, taking into account the owners’ ability to
commit to such punishment, and comparing the stability conditions with those in Lemmas 2 and 3.
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Proposition 1 Collusion is more stable in the infinitely repeated Cournot delegation model 
     ⇤d = 2597
 
than in the infinitely repeated standard Cournot model
 
     ⇤ = 917
 
.
Comparing profits in the infinitely repeated version of FJS’s Cournot delegation model
with those in the infinitely repeated standard Cournot model yields a lower equilibrium profit
2(a c)2
25b <
(a c)2
9b for low discount factors   <
25
97 , but a higher equilibrium profit
(a c)2
8b >
(a c)2
9b
for intermediate discount factors 2597    < 917 , and the same equilibrium profit (a c)
2
8b for high
discount factors     917 . Figure 1b illustrates graphically and Proposition 2 summarizes.
Proposition 2 In an infinitely repeated setting, FJS’s static key result that delegation re-
duces firms’ profitability does not hold for high discount factors, is reversed for intermediate
discount factors, and survives for low discount factors.
3.2 Product Market Collusion by Owners Without Delegation
Owners may choose not to delegate at all and collude on the product market themselves. As
Lemma 3 indicates, owners can commit not to delegate and collude on quantities if and only
if     2597 . Hence, even without delegation in equilibrium, the very possibility of delegation
improves the stability of collusion between owners.
3.3 Firing Managers
When managers can be fired, the collusive delegation equilibrium derived in (6) can be
supported by firing the deviant manager, while hiring a new manager who continues to
collude. Then, the owner’s punishment strategy of no delegation becomes irrelevant and the
only relevant constraint is that managers do not defect from collusion, i.e.,  ⇤d   19 by Lemma
2. Hence, firing managers makes the collusive delegation equilibrium even more stable.
4 Conclusion
Strategic delegation improves cartel stability. The intuition is that managers face a zero payoff
after defection as owners will punish them by not delegating control anymore. Owners can
commit to such punishment for a large set of discount factors, because an owner’s defection
from this punishment strategy results in FJS’s unprofitable one-shot delegation equilibrium.
6
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Appendix
A Benchmarks
Outcome (4) is straightforwardly obtained as the static Nash equilibrium when both owners
independently maximize ⇡i = (p  c) qi, while outcome (5) is obtained when owners jointly
maximize
P2
i=1 ⇡i. When owner j produces qmj =
a c
4b , owner i’s optimal defection quantity
is qDi = argmaxqi
  
a  b  qi + qmj    c  qi = 3(a c)8b , leading to profit ⇡Di = 9(a c)264b . Thus,
collusion is stable if and only if
 o   ⇡
D
i   ⇡mi
⇡Di   ⇡⇤i
=
9
17
.
Consider FJS’s one-shot Cournot delegation game. In stage 3, both managers indepen-
dently maximize Mi = (p  ↵ic) qi, leading to quantities as a function of incentives
qi (↵i,↵j) =
a  2↵ic+ ↵jc
3b
. (7)
In stage 2, both owners substitute these into ⇡i = (a  b (qi + qj)  c) qi to independently
maximize profit, yielding outcome (3), provided that both owners indeed delegate in stage 1.
If both owners keep control, they each earn the Cournot Nash profit ⇡⇤i =
(a c)2
9b . If
owner i delegates, while owner j keeps control, then quantities as a function of incentives
↵i become qi (↵i, 1) and qj (1,↵i) by (7). In stage 2, owner i then maximizes ⇡i (↵i) =
(a  b (qi (↵i, 1) + qj (1,↵i))  c) qi (↵i, 1), yielding ↵i = 5c a4c and
⇡i =
(a  c)2
8b
, ⇡j =
(a  c)2
16b
. (8)
Since owner i is better off by delegating if her rival keeps control, while owner j is worse off
if she keeps control and her rival delegates compared to when both owners delegate, owners
indeed delegate in stage 1.
B Equilibrium Incentives With Delegation
In stage 3, managers jointly maximize
P2
i=1Mi, yielding q1 + q2 =
a ↵1c
2b =
a ↵2c
2b . Focusing
on symmetric equilibria, both managers set the same quantity as a function of incentives,
q1 = q2 =
a ↵1c
2b =
a ↵2c
2b , which holds for symmetric incentives ↵1 = ↵2 = ↵, resulting in q1 =
q2 =
a ↵c
2b . Substituting these in the owners’ profit functions gives ⇡i (↵) =
[a (2 ↵)c](a ↵c)
8b ,
which is maximized at ↵m1 = ↵m2 = ↵ = 1 in stage 2, resulting in outcome (6).
8
C Optimality of “Not Delegating Control” As the Punishment Strategy
This appendix shows that not delegating control is indeed the best strategy for owners to
punish a deviant manager. First, suppose owners instead punish by reverting to “delegation
and compete in setting incentives.” We then get FJS’s static delegation outcome (3) with
managerial payoff M⇤di =
4(a c)2
25b , which is actually higher than managerial payoff in the
collusive delegation equilibrium Mmdi =
(a c)2
8b , thereby making collusion fully unstable.
Second, suppose owners punish by reverting to “delegation and collude in setting incen-
tives.” In stage 3, managers set quantities as outlined in (7). In stage 2, owners substitute
these into their joint profit function
P2
i=1 ⇡i, which is maximized with symmetric incentives
↵i =
3
4 +
a
4c , yielding ⇡i =
(a c)2
8b and Mi =
(a c)2
18b . If owner i deviates by setting different in-
centives, straightforward algebra leads to the optimal deviating incentive being ↵i = 2116   5a16c
with profit ⇡i = 25(a c)
2
128b . This triggers punishment by FJS’s static Nash equilibrium with
⇡⇤di =
2(a c)2
25b . Thus, owners can commit to punishment iff.  own  
25(a c)2
128b   (a c)
2
8b
25(a c)2
128b  ⇡dNi
= 2541 , and
managers do not defect in the first place iff.  man  
9(a c)2
64b   (a c)
2
8b
9(a c)2
64b   (a c)
2
18b
= 949 . These stability
conditions are more difficult to satisfy than  own   2597 ,  man   19 from Lemmas 2 and 3.
D Owner’s Commitment to Avoid Delegation
Suppose owners punish a deviant manager by keeping control, while competing on the prod-
uct market. Owner i then earns ⇡⇤i =
(a c)2
9b . If she defects from the punishment scheme
by delegating control, then in stage 3 manager i and owner j compete with respective pay-
offs Mi (qi, qj) = (a  b (qi + qj)  ↵ic) qi and ⇡j (qi, qj) = (a  b (qi + qj)  c) qj, yielding
quantities qi (↵i) = a+(1 2↵i)c3 , qj (↵i) =
a+(↵i 2)c
3 and profit
⇡i (↵i) =
✓
a  b
✓
a+ (1  2↵i) c
3
+
a+ (↵i   2) c
3
◆
  c
◆
a+ (1  2↵i) c
3
,
which owner i maximizes at ⇡i = (a c)
2
8b with ↵i =
5
4  a4c . Since defection triggers punishment
by FJS’s one-shot delegation Nash equilibrium with profit ⇡⇤di =
2(a c)2
25b (see equations (3)),
owners can commit to punishment if and only if  own  
(a c)2
8   (a c)
2
9
(a c)2
8   2(a c)
2
25
= 2581 .
Now suppose owners punish a deviant manager by keeping control, while colluding on
the product market. Owner i then earns ⇡mi =
(a c)2
8b , while defection from the punishment
scheme by delegating control results in competition between manager i and owner j with
defection profit ⇡i = (a c)
2
8b (see equations (8)). Since defection profit equals collusive profit,
owners will not defect from punishment through delegation.
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